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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 




DANIEL J. CORDOVA, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 15414 
This is an action for divorce, Plaintiff-Appellant 
is appealing the decision of the trial court with regard to 
the amount of alimony awarded her and the division of the 
property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable George E. Ballif, one of the judges of 
the Fourth District Court awarded both the Plaintiff-Appel-
lant and the Defendant-Respondent a Decree of Divorce on the 
27th day of June, 1977, (R-38). The trial court awarded 
Plaintiff-Appellant the sum of $150.00 per month per child 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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as child support for the two minor children d th an e sum o: 
$75. 00 per month as alimony to continue for a period of 3, 
months, commencing with the month of June, 1977, (!(.-3g), 
The court further awarded each of the parties the furnitur' 
and other personal property which the parties had respec-
tively divided before the trial with the exception of a 
loveseat and black chair which were awarded to the Plaint: 
Appellant, (R-40). The court's award of the personal 
property to the Defendant-Respondent included his retire-
ment account with his employer, Grand Central Stores, a~ 
the bonus received by him one month prior to the trial of 
this matter, (R-40). The court further ordered the partk 
to divide equally the $588. 00 income tax refund for the 
year 1976, (R-40). Plaintiff-Appellant filed her Motion 
for a New Trial or, in the Alternative, to Amend the Find:: 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce on t~ 
27th day of June, 1977, (R-33), requesting the court to 
reconsider its decision limiting the Plaintiff-Appellant's 
alimony to $75. 00 per month and the court's failure to awa: 
her one-half of Defendant-Respondent's April bonus of 
$1,800.00 gross and $1,255.00 net, its failure to consider 
future bonuses as income in the determination of a reason· 
able amount of support for Plaintiff-Appellant and one-
half of the accumulated retirement fund account, all of 
-2-
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which were assets acquired by the parties during the course 
of the marriage. In accordance with the Rules of the Fourth 
District Court, Memorandums of Points and Authorities were 
filed by both Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant-Respondent, 
(R-16-20 and R-21-30). The court entered its Minute 
Entry, (R-15), denying Plaintiff-Appellant's Motion on 
the 1st day of September, 1977 without hearing, Plaintiff-
Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal, (R-13), on the 16th 
day of September, 1977. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
and Plaintiff-Appellant should be awarded the sum of 
$150.00 per month as alimony without limitation and should 
be awarded a cash sum equivalent to one-half of the net 
sum of the April bonus of $1,255,00 and one-half of the 
Defendant-Respondent's retirement fund of $2,104.90 plus 
accumulations as her share of the marital assets, 
The Utah County Clerk failed to mark each page of the 
two transcripts, marking the entire transcript of the proceed-
ings in two volumes, C-92 and c-93. Plaintiff-Appellant's 
references thereto will be to the transcript, either C-92 or 
-3-
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C-93 and the pages and lines referred therein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were r.i.arried on the 31st day of August. 
1973 in Pocatello, Idaho, (C-·93, page 3, lines 26-28), bu: 
had lived together for a total period of 5 1/2 years, 
(C-93, page 43, line 6). The ?arties have two children 
born as issue of this marriage, CHRISTOPHER JAKE C0RDOVi\, 
age 2 and ROBE:R.T PAUL CORDOVA, age 10 weeks at the time o: 
the trial, (C-93, page 4, lines 1-3} . During the course o: 
the marriage the Plaintiff-Appellant worked for ap?roximat: 
two years, (C-93, page 24, lines 11-23) , and the Defendant· 
Respondent worked continuously for Grand Central Store3 :c: 
approximately seven years. .At t!le time of the trial in th: 
matter, the parties owned a 1974 Pinto automobile driven b: 
Plaintiff-Appellant, a 1974 Ford Galaxie driven by Defenda:.: 
Respondent, a profit sharing plan with Grand Central Store: 
in the sum of $2, 104. 09 through August 1, 1976, (.C-92, pase 
11, lines 17-22}. In addition, earnings had been accurnula:: 
in said account to the date of the trial but would not be 
9osted until the end of July, 1977, (C-92, '.Jage 11, lines:. 
30). Defendant-Respondent had further received a bonus :::: 
Grand Central Stores in April, 1977 of $1,300.00 gross 
-4-
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(C-92, page 9, line 28), which resulted in a net sum of 
$1,255.00, (C-92, page 37, line 13), all of which funds 
Defendant-~espondent had for his exclusive use and benefit, 
(C-92, page 37, lines 13-22 and page 38, lines 1-5), The 
parties further had received a tax refund of $558,00 for 
the year 1976, (C-93, page 10, line 21), with no part of 
said funds being given to the Plaintiff-Appellant upon 
receipt, (C-93, page 11, lines 6-21). 
During the course of the trial, the Plaintiff-
Appellant introduced exhibits with regard to her living 
expenses, numbered Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7, 8 and 11, 
indicating expenditures of $248.50, $370.14, $369.05 and 
$409.70 for the months of February, March, April and May, 
respectively, with a notation thereon that said sums did 
not include "expenditures for child care, gasoline, 
clothing, doctor, drugs and miscellaneous needs". Plain-
tiff-A?pellant further introduced Exhibit No. 9 which set 
forth her monthly living expenses of $770.63 per month 
which she believed would be sufficient to support herself 
and the two minor children of the parties. 
It was further disclosed by the testimony of Bill 
Donaldson, Personnel Director of Grand Central Stores, that 
the Defendant-Respondent had earned the sum of $18,264.51 
-5-
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during the year of 1976, (C-92, page 9, lines 18 and 191 , 
and had earned from January through May 15, 1977 a gross 
sum of $8,151.00, (C-92, page 9, lines 10 and 11). 11r. 
Donaldson further indicated in his testimony that through 
May 15, 1977 the total gross federal tax deductions amour::. 
to $1,408.39, total state tax deductions amounted to $309. 
and the total FICA deductions amounted to $476. 79, (C-92, 
page 19, line 5) , leaving a net income available to Defenc: 
Respondent for a 19 week period of 1977 of $5, 955. 96 or a:. 
average of $313. 4 7 per week. It was the further testimon'· 
of Mr. Donaldson that bonuses had been paid for the last 
three years to Grand Central Store managers, directors anc 
assistant managers, (C-93, page 21, lines 18-20). 
Plaintiff-Appellant, in her direct testimony, i~~ 
cated she could not work at this time due to the young age: 
of the children (C-93, page 31, lines 2-7) and was relyin: 
upon her husband for support of herself and said children. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN LIMITING 
PLAINTIFF'S ALIMONY TO $75.00 PER 
MONTH FOR THREE YEARS. 
-6-
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The uncontroverted testimony of Bill Donaldson, 
Personnel Director of Grand Central Stores, was that the 
Defendant-Respondent had earned $8,151.00 from January 1, 
1977 to May 15, 1977 with total federal, state and FICA 
tax deductions amounting to $2,195.04 which resulted in a 
net income for that 19 week period of 1977 of $5,955.96 
or a net monthly average of $1,323.55. On that basis, 
the trial court awarded the Plaintiff-Appellant a total sum 
of $375.00 per month, $75.00 alimony and $300.00 child 
support, which is insufficient for the support of Plaintiff-
Appellant and the two minor children. Defendant-Respondent's 
1976 income was $18,264.51 which should have been taken into 
consideration in determining the amount of alimony to be 
awarded in accordance with the holding in Anita Dumesnil 
Cummings vs. Patrick c. Cummings, 562 P.2d 229, (1977). 
Plaintiff-Appellant, through Exhibits No. P-6, P-7, 
P-8 and P-11, showed the court that $375.00 per month alimony 
and child support was insufficient to support herself and the 
two minor children of the parties as said sum did not meet 
the basic needs of the family unit, let alone provide her 
funds for child care, gasoline, clothing, doctor, drugs and 
miscellaneous expenses. Further, Plaintiff-Appellant intro-
duced Exhibit No. P-9 which indicated Plaintiff-Appellant 
-7-
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required $770.63 per month to properly support herself anc 
the two minor children of the parties in a ma nner equivale· 
to the standard of living established by the parties ~tit 
their marriage. 
Considering the fact that the Plaintiff-Appellant 
had testified that the two children of the parties were 
two years and 10 weeks old, respectively, that she has no 
income, that she could not find work with children until 
they had attained the age of three years and could be care: 
for in a nursery school and, in light of the evidence of 
her living expenses and Defendant-Respondent's income, it 
is not unreasonable to require that this husband and father 
provide a suitable sum for support of the family, sufficier 
to keep them from becoming public charges of the State of 
Utah. The decision of the trial court, refusing to grant 
Plaintiff-Appellant alimony of $150. 00 per month or more 
until her remarriage or death, is not only a clear abuse o: 
the court's discretion and an error at law but totally 
ignores the uncontroverted fact that the Defendant-Respon· 
dent has the ability to support Plaintiff-Appellant and 
the two minor children of the parties in a manner equivale: 
'c 
to the standard of living established by the parties dunn 
their marriage. 
-8-
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In the recent decision of Janet M. English vs. w. 
Daniel English, 565 P.2d 409 (1977), the court set forth 
certain guidelines for the determination of a proper award 
of alimony: 
"The standard utilized by the trial court, 
viz., the length of the marriage and the 
contribution of each to their joint finan-
cial success, is not ar. appropriate measure 
to determine alimony. There is a distinction 
between the division of assets accumulated 
during the marriage which should be distri-
buted upon an equitable basis and the post-
marital duty of support maintenance. 
The purpose is to provide support for the 
wife and not to inflict punitive damages 
on the husband. Alimony is not intended 
as a penalty against the husband nor a 
reward to the wife" .. 2 Nelson Divorce 
and Annulment (2nd Edition, 1961 Rev. Vol., 
Section 14.06, pages 11 and 12). 
In Nance vs. Nance, 107.Arizona 411, 489 P.2d 48,50 
(1971), the Court stated: 
"The most important function of alimony 
is to provide suoport for the wife as 
nearly as possible to the standard of 
living she enjoyed during the marriage, 
and to prevent the wife from becoming 
a public charge. The Court observ7d, 
that criteria considered in determining 
a reasonable award for support and main-
tenance included the financial conditions 
and needs of the wife, the ability of the 
wife to produce sufficient income for 
herself and the ability of the husband t~ 
provide suoport." (Emphasis added.) Stein 
vs. Stein, 196 Montana 496, 499 P.2d 794 
(1972); Thompson vs. Thompson, 82 Wash.2d 
-9-
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352, 510 P. 2d 827 (197 3); Burnside vs. 
Burnside, 85 New Mexico 517, 514 P.2d 36 
(1973); Carlton vs. Carlton, 217 Kansas 
631, 583 P. 2d 727 (1975). 
In Hendricks vs. Hendricks, 91 Utah 553, 559, 63 P.2d 217 
(1936), the Court stated: 
"The amount of alimony is measured by the 
wife's needs and requirements considering 
her station in life and upon the husband's 
ability to pay." 
The English decision, supra, clearly establishes th: 
alimony should be sufficient to prevent the wife fromb~ 
corning a public charge and should support her as nearly as 
possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage. The award of $75.00 per month alimony for the 
Plaintiff-Appellant and $300.00 child support out of a 
net income of $1, 323. 55 per month available to the Defendar: 
Respondent is an abuse of the court's discretion. Such a 
decision, if allowed to stand, will not only require Plain· 
tiff-Appellant to seek assistance from the State of Utah to 
support herself and the two minor children of the parties 
but is such an unfair application of the principles of ln 
and equity that it requires to be reversed and to have this 
court make its own findings as established in Nona W. 
Watson vs. Norman A. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072 (1977) · 
Upon a careful evaluation of the record, Plaintiff· 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant believes a fair and equitable amount that should 
have been awarded to her as alimony would be at least $150.00 
per month. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO AWARD 
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT A CASH SUM 
EQUIVALENT TO ONE-HALF OF THE BONUS AND 
THE ACCUMULATED RETIREMENT ACCOUNT OF 
THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 
It is the Plaintiff-Appellant's position that Defen-
dant-Respondent's retirement account of $2,104.09 plus the 
unpasted accumulations and the bonus received by him on the 
10th of April, 1977 of $1,800.00 gross and $1,255.00 net 
was a marital asset to be divided between the parties in 
accordance with §30-3-5 Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation 
to the children, property and parties 
and the maintenance of the parties and 
children, as may be equitable." 
The Defendant-Respondent did not contradict that he 
received the bonus of $1,800,00 on the 10th day of April, 
1977 and that he had accumulated in his retirement account 
$2,104.09 plus earnings to be posted in July of 1977. 
The evidence clearly established that Defendant-
Responden t had complete control of the bonus received 
-11-
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one month prior to the trial of this matter and did not 
consult with the Plaintiff-Appellant or take into consi-
deration her needs or those of the two minor children of 
the parties in how the funds should be spent. The trial 
court should have considered the bonus received and those 
to be received by the Defendant-Respondent as income duri:. 
any taxable year and thus should have awarded her a greatE: 
sum as alimony or as a marital asset to be divided equal!; 
between the parties. The court's failure to award Plaint 
Appellant alimony of a sufficient sum to support herself: 
the children or an equitable di vision of these assets ef£: 
tively denied Plaintiff-Appellant a fair and equitable dis 
tribution of this marital estate. 
It is quite clear from case decisions being handed 
down throughout the country that courts are considering 
accurnula tions in retirement accounts as assets acquired b;· 
the parties during the marriage which constitute marital 
property to be divided between the parties, In re 
Marriage of Brown, 126 Ca.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561 (1976); 
Smith vs. Lewis, 118 Ca.Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 589, (1975); 
Ramsey vs. Ramsey, 96 Ida. 72, 535 P.2d 53, (1975); ~ 
vs. LeClert, 88 N.Mex. 235, 453 P.2d 755, (1969); ~ 
-12-
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Morris, 419 P.2d 129 (1966); Payne vs. Payne, 82 wash.2d 
573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973) and Wilder vs. Wilder, 84 wash.2d 
364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975). The Plaintiff-Appellant further 
cites the following equitable distribution state as having 
further supported her position that retirement plans are 
marital property to be divided between the parties at the 
time of the dissolution proceedings, In re Marriage of 
Powers, Missouri, 527 SW2d 944 (Mo. App. 1975) where the 
husband's interest in a pri~ate company profit sharing was 
determined as marital property to be divided between the 
parties, Callahan vs. Callahan, N.J. 2 Fam. L. Rptr. 2585 
(N.J. super. Ct. June 16, 1976); Kruger vs. Kruger, 139 N,J. 
super. 413, 354 Atl.2d 340 (1976); Blitt vs. Blitt, 139 N.J. 
super. 213, 253 Atl.2d 144 (1976); White vs. White, 136 N.J. 
super. 552 (App. Div. 1975); Hughes vs. Hughes, 132 N.J. 
super. 559, 334 Atl.2d 379 (1975); Pinkowski vs. Pinkowski, 
67 Wis.2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518 (1975), (prior case decided). 
In the Brown decision, supra, the court overruled its prior 
position that a retirement account was not a marital asset 
of the parties, stating: 
"As we shall explain, the French Rule cannot 
stand because non-vested pension rights are 
not an expectancy, but a contingent interest 
in property; furthermore, the French Rule c~m­
pels an inequitable division of rights acquired 
-13-
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through a corrununity effort. Pension rights, 
~hether or not vested, represent a property 
interest. To the extent that such rights 
deriv~ from emplo~ent during ~overture, they 
comprise a corrununity asset subJect to division 
in a dissolution proceedings." 
The Brown case, supra, further went on to deal with the de 
nition of the term vested and indicated that: 
"In the divorce and dissolution cases following 
French vs. French, however, the term "vested" 
has acquired a special meaning; it refers to 
a pension right which is not subject to a 
condition of forfeiture if the employment 1 
relationship terminates before retirement. 
We shall use the term "vested" in the latter 
sense as defining a pension right which 
survives a discharge or voluntary termination 
of employee." 
"Depending upon the provisions of the retire-
ment program, an employee's right may vest 
after a term of service even though it does 
not mature until he reaches retirement age 
and elects to retire." 
The Brown case, supra, further went on to specifically sta: 
that such pension plans represent a form of deferred compe 
sation for services rendered and the employees right to sui 
benefit is a contractual right derived from the terms of 
his employment contract. 
1 See article 'T'he Identification and Division.of 
' - . · · ·bl Pie, Entangible Corrununity Property; Slicing The Invisi e 
1973 6 u.c. Davis Law Review 26, 29-31. 
-14-
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The cases have further indicated that a pension or 
retirement fund is in fact earned property by virtue of the 
years of work a person has placed in his employment and is 
in fact deferred compensation rather than a gratuity, Ramsey 
vs. Ramsey, supra; LeClert vs. LeClert, supra; Morris vs. 
Morris, supra; Marriage of Brown, supra. 
In reviewing the various cases, Plaintiff-Respondent 
specifically refers the Court to Smith vs. Lewis, 118 ca. 
Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 589· (1975), wherein the wife had 
brought a malpractice action against her attorney for the 
divorce proceeding for his failure to assert her position 
with regard to her former husband's National Guard Federal 
and State Retirement Beneifts. The Court held: 
"That the retirement benefits which flow from 
the employment relationship, to the extent they 
are vested, are community property subject to 
equal division between the spouses in event the 
marriage is dissolved . . (additional case cited} 
because such benefits are part of the considera-
tion earned by the employee, they are accorded 
community treatment regardless of whether they 
derive from the State, Federal or private source, 
or from a contributory or non-contributory plan." 
This court, in Baker vs. Baker, 551 P.2d 1263 (1976) 
and in Hanson vs. Hanson, 537 P.2d 491, Utah 1975, has 
clearly stated: 
"That the trial court has considerable 
latitude and discretion in adjusting 
-15-
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financial and property interests and 
it is the burden of the moving party to 
show that there was either a misunder-
standing or misapplication of the laws 
resulting in a substantial or prejudicial 
error; or that the evidence clearly pro-
ponderated against the findings; or that 
such a serious inequity has resulted as 
to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
In the particular case at hand, the parties, durinc 
the marriage, had acquired a 1974 Pinto automobile, a 197l 
Ford Galaxie, furniture, a credit union savings account wi: 
Grand Central, Defendant-Respondent's semi-annual bonuses, 
a tax return of $588.00 and a profit sharing plan of $2,H; 
plus earnings from Defendant-Respondent's employer, Grand 
Central. The court, in its Memorandum Decision, dividedt' 
furniture between the parties pursuant to their agreement, 
awarded each of the parties one of the automobiles, dividec 
the income tax refund between the parties, gave Plaintifi· 
Appellant the care, custody and control of the two minor 
children of the parties and the sum of $15 0. 00 per child pe 
month for child support and $7 5. 00 per month alimony and 
awarded the Defendant-Respondent the April bonus of $1,800. 
all future bonuses and his profit sharing plan in the s~c 
$2,104.09 plus unposted earnings, without compensati~~~ 
tiff-Appellant in any manner. Such an unequal distributio: 
of the bonuses and profit sharing plan is a clear abuse of 
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the court's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectively submitted by the Plaintiff-
Appellant that the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed and that she should be awarded at least the sum 
of $150.00 per month as alimony without any limitation 
and that she should be awarded a cash sum equivalent to 
one-half of Defendant-Respondent's retirement and net 
bonus together with attorney fees and costs associated 
with this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL H. LIAPIS 
GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
1610 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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